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A GERMAN REPLIES TO "J'ACCUSE" 



A SLANDERER 



NOTES ON THE HISTORY 

OF THE 

PERIOD PRECEDING 
THE WORLD WAR 

By 

PROF. DR. THEODOR SCHIEMANN 



ISSUES AND EVENTS 
NEW YORK 



Price 25 cents 



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A SLANDERER 



NOTES ON THE HISTORY 

OF THE 

PERIOD PRECEDING 
THE WORLD WAR 

By 
PROF. DR. THEODOR SCHIEMANN 



ISSUES AND EVENTS 
NEW YORK 



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A SLANDERER 



NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF 

THE PERIOD PRECEDING 

THE WORLD WAR 

BY 
PROFESSOR DR. THEODOR SCHIEMANN 

UNDER the French title "J'accuse" there has been pub- 
lished in the German language, but on the soil of 
French Switzerland, a pamphlet "by a German" which 
will doubtless be greeted as highly gratifying in France, 
England, Russia, and wherever else Germany's enemies are 
weaving their intrigues. The anonymous author has bor- 
rowed from the Russian coat of arms the title vignette: 
St. George thrusting his lance down the dragon's throat. 
But he sets over it this verse as motto: 

Wer die Wahrheit kennt und sagt sie nicht, 
Der ist fiirv^rahr ein erbarmlicher Wicht P) 

The "Accuser" has chosen as sponsor a Swiss living in 
Lausanne, Dr. Anton Suter, who has the impudence to take 
upon himself the responsibility for the publication of this 
libel, and to commend it as an "act which can turn out to 
be nothing but a blessing to the German people and to 
mankind." This Mr. Suter was clearly incapable of seeing 
through the misstatements and the downright falsehoods 
which the "accuser" tries to foist on undiscriminating or 
hopelessly prejudiced readers. 

No, the author of "J'accuse" is in no respect "a German 
patriot," but a deliberate slanderer who well knows from 
personal experience that, of all the masks behind which 
slander conceals its true features, that of the heart-broken 
patriot is the most effective. He very well knows that 
what he presents to his readers as "the truth ' is merely 
that prearranged list of accusations — garnished with poison- 
ous sophistries of his own manufacture — with which our 
enemies are trying to win over the public opinion of the 
world. 



^Who knows the truth and brin.^s it not to light 
He is, in sooth, a pitiable wight. 



With that truth which may not be kept dark, the con- 
tents of "J'accuse" have nothing in common, A chain of 
assertions is presented to us which have as little to do with 
actual facts as those predictions of this "German" in which 
our economic, military, and moral downfall are foretold. 
Today no one believes in such an outcome, not even in the 
camp of our enemies, no, not even those Augurs who, in 
the hope of some such denouement, set in motion the chain 
of events that led to the world war — Poincare, Asquith, 
Goremykin, who allowed their names to be used to cover 
the secret work of Delcasse, Grey, Iswolski and Ssassonow. 
Today all of them are looking forward with horror to the 
moment when the structure which they wished to erect 
will collapse and bury them under its ruins. And with them, 
under the burden of his shame, will collapse this "accuser," 
when the German people in its hour of victory turns away 
with loathing from those who had hoped to profit by fling- 
ing mud at their own fatherland. 

"J'accuse" starts out with the chapter, "Germany, Awake!" 
Its aim is to give the German reader a light by which to 
perceive the following of the Accuser's "truths": 

1. That this war was long since planned and prepared 
for by Germany, not only on the field of war, but of politics ; 

2. That it had long since been agreed that this war of 
aggression should be presented to the German people as a 
war of liberation, since it was known that only in this 
way could the necessary enthusiasm be counted on; 

3. That the object of this war was to be the achieve- 
ment of the hegemony of the continent and, in the course 
of time, the conquest of England's position as a world power, 
in accordance with the principle : ote-toi de la que je m'y 
mette ! 

Has a more shameless inversion of the truth ever been 
heard from the mouth of a German to the prejudice of his 
own fatherland? 

We oppose him with the following propositions : 

1. That this war was desired by France in the first in- 
stance, was brought closer to realization by the Russian- 
French alliance, and, through England's joining hands with 
these conspirators, became, under English leadership, neces- 
sary and inevitable ; 

2. That these three powers had long since resolved to 
break Germany's powerful strategic position in Central 
Europe, and had been systematically working to educate the 
world up to the notion that this proceeding is a moral 
necessity; 

3. That in this war which has been thus forced on us 
our goal should be the permanent safeguarding of our bor- 
ders and the freeing of the seas from English tyranny. 

The actual contents of the "accusation," and our own 



contrasting point of view, have now^ been clearly charac- 
terized, as far as fundamentals go. But the anonymous 
accuser tries through four further sections of his book to 
bolster up those theses of his which are not, as he would 
have it appear, formulated for the German people, but for 
the enemies of our people. He calls them: 

11. History of the Period Preceding the Crime (N. B. our 
crime). 

III. The Crime. 

IV. Consequences of the Deed. 
V. The Future and Epilogue. 

Unedifying as the task is, we mean to follow him up, step 
by step. 

The "History of the Period Preceding the Crime" includes 
pages 25 to 113, and begins with a section on: "Our Imper- 
ialists : Bernhardi & Co." 

The author's first great falsification is this — that he treats 
"imperialism" as if it expressed a German desire for world 
conquest, whereas word and conception are, as everyone 
knows, of English origin, and were coined on the occasion 
of the British Colonial Conferences at Queen Victoria jubi- 
lee. It was only by a malicious distortion that they were 
later applied to the tendencies of German politics and the 
currents in the soul of the German people. The writings of 
General von Bernhardi, moreover, which the author attacks, 
appeared — a fact that has natural!}^ also been left unmen- 
tioned — in 1912, at a time when the aggressive policies of 
the powers of the Triple Entente left no doubt that soon or 
late we should have to reckon on a coalition of England, 
Russia and France, whose goal was no less than our polit- 
ical humiliation, to be followed, as a logical consequence, 
by the annihilation of the German position and power. It 
was the old prescription: avilir, puis demolir. The brave 
books of Bernhardi, with a clear prevision of what was in 
preparation, pointed out the necessity of grasping the 
sword before the conspiracy which threatened Germany 
should become active. That was the more his perfect right 
since the threat of v/ar, particularly on the part of England 
and Russia, had, as we shall see, for years never let up. 
But it is a downright falsification to identify the advice 
of Bernhardi with the secret aims of our government. His 
writings — insofar as they were not of a purely military char- 
acter — were inopportune and unwelcome to the government, 
since it foresaw the misuse to which they could be put by 
the evilly inclined. Today it is unlikely that anj-one will 
deny that Bernhardi saw and judged the situation correctly. 
The distinguished American, Thomas C. Hall, Professor of 
Christian ethics in New York, and now lecturing at Gottln- 
gen as exchange professor, vigorously repudiated the hypo- 
critical expressions of indignation over the writings of 



Bernhardi and Treitschke as early as January, 1915. "How 
many who are horrified at Bernhardi or Treitschke have 
really read either of these men and really know what they 
stand for? They are indeed free from some of the ingrained 
'homage our vices pay to virtue,' but there is not an opin- 
ion expressed on force and war that could not be matched 
with a hundred quotations from English and American 
sources, including such apostles of peace as Mr. Roosevelt, 
Dr. Lyman Abbott and Lord Roberts. Both men, however, 
knew what they were talking about and do not pretend 
that a pagan world about us is really governed by Christian 
principles !" 

It is also a historically untenable proposition to say that a 
preventive war cannot, after its own fashion, be a defensive 
war. What was the war which Frederick the Great waged 
for seven long years for the maintenance of the Prussian 
state, if not a defensive war in which he would have been 
lost had he not played the praevenire. That saying so often 
used in the 17th Century, "Melius est praevenire quam 
praeveniri," describes exactly the decision which Frederick 
had to make, and corresponds to the conditions with which 
we had to reckon in 1914. 

But the "Accuser" even goes so far as to include the 
German-Austrian Alliance among those facts which he em- 
braces under the catchword, "Preliminary History of the 
Crime," without permitting himself to be turned aside by 
the particular fact that this combination, and the later acces- 
sion of Italy, kept the peace of Europe for 44 years. In 
this "Preliminary History" he treats our "senseless" colonial 
policy, our efforts to secure a "place in the sun," which, as 
he interprets it, is made to mean that we are striving for 
the exclusive place in the sun and for world mastery; for 
he thus states it — the place in the sun for us, the place in 
the shadow for the others. Equally superficial and "inspired" 
are the sections that follow, pages 55 to 68. They are not 
worth referring to, especially as in the later sections the 
same questions are constantly being taken up. But a very 
decided protest must be lodged against the author's way of 
introducing his opinion with the word "we" and trying in 
this way to seem to be one with us. We have as little in 
common with the sentiments of this "German," as with 
what he represents as truth, but which in reality is a web 
of ignorance and of conscious falsification of fact. This 
shows itself in the most pronounced way in the sections 
on "The Policy of Isolation" and "The First Hague Con- 
ference." The "Accuser" seeks to explain away the "Policy 
of Isolation" as a merely geographical conception, and 
flatly declares that there is no proof of England's aggressive 
designs against us. As we shall, in the course of this expo- 
sition, bring out facts which leave no doubt as to England's 



aggressive designs, we shall now take up the section on "The 
First Hague Conference," which demands a more searching 
criticism. 

The First Hague Conference 

It is in connection with the first Hague Conference that 
the "Accuser" tries to show that English love of peace and 
German pettifoggery stood at that time in fixed opposition, 
and that our policies caused the collapse of a magnanimous 
attempt on the part of England at peace and reconciliation. 
The so-called Peace Manifesto of Nicolas H of August 12th 
24th 1898^ which, as everyone knows, suggested a decreasing 
of armaments and the calling of a conference for the con- 
sideration of measures to secure universal peace, serves as 
his point of departure. 

The "Accuser" seems to know nothing of the political an- 
tecedents of this Russian proposal. He contents himself 
with referring to Bloch's well-known book^ and to Salis- 
bury's wail over the cost of armament in the year 1869. The 
naive notion that the Czar had read these things does not 
deserve refutation. On the other hand it is not unimportant 
to learn the true connection of events which led to the call- 
ing of the first so-called peace conference. On March 27, 
1898, was signed the agreement which, to the bitter anger 
of Japan, established the cession to Russia of the Lino- 
Tung Peninsula and of Port Arthur. Shortly afterwards, 
on the 20th of May, Japan had to leave Wei-Hai-wei as well, 
which was then at once occupied by the English. The Eng- 
lish competition in East Asiatic waters had been watched 
with growing displeasure in Russia, and as early as the 
8th of April, 1898, the "Nowoje Wremja," which then, as so 
often before and since represented the designs of the Rus- 
sian foreign office, threatened a Russian-Japanese alliance 
in the event of England's carrying out her dangerous de- 
signs in the Gulf of Petschili. If England were to establish 
itself permanently in Wei-hai-wei, Russia would demand an 
extension of its territory in Central Asia. Indeed, on the 
7th of April the "N. W." went so far as to declare that 
the Anglo-Russian agreement of March 11, 1895, was no 
longer to be considered binding. 

But that meant that the Anglo-Russian conflict over Cen- 
tral Asia, which had been adjusted with such difficulty, 
might again break out, and was calculated to frighten Eng- 
land, whereas, as a matter of fact the anxiety was on the 
Russian side. It was in connection with these events that 
the disarmament proposal in question was made. It was 
made under the very correct impression that England 
which was always parading its humanitarian sentiments. 



iWrongly set by the accuser as the 28th of August, 
ilwan Stanislawowitsch: "The Future War," 6 vols., Peters- 
burg 1898 (Russian). 



would not be able to reject it. It was believed that this 
could be counted on the more, as England had at that 
very time (the 10th of July) insulted France in deadly fash- 
ion at Fashoda, and was simultaneously making prepara- 
tions for the war against the Transvaal. Directly after this 
Russian disarmament proposal, Russia and France made 
feverish efforts to increase their navy. The Czar, who as 
early as March, 1898, had appropriated the sum of 90 million 
roubles for the extension of his fleet, ordered the comple- 
tion of the work to be hastened as much as possible; and in 
France a subscription was taken up for the building of sub- 
marines, although point 4 of the program for the peace 
conference proposed by the Russian Minister of foreign 
affairs, Murawjew, expressly prohibited this method of war- 
fare. In the royal speech at the opening of the English 
parliament in February, 1899, the Russian proposal was re- 
ferred to with scepticism. "We must," said Lord Salisbury 
in the Upper House, "keep clearly in mind the dangers and 
imperfections of the relations in which we live, and be re- 
solved not to owe our peace to the consideration, or to the 
love of peace, of others. That would be criminal!" 

So when on May 18, 1899, the Hague Conference was 
opened, it was met with the utmost distrust in all the organs 
of the government party, the English Unionists. The "Stand- 
ard" of June 21, 1899, declared that the safeguarding of pri- 
vate property at sea, proposed at the conference, would 
result in the downfall of the English Sea Power. "When 
it comes to serious business conventions count for little ;" 
our "most vital interests, our trade, demands that we re- 
serve to ourselves the right of attack which we owe to our 
sovereignty of the sea." And that the plan for the safe- 
guarding of private property at sea collapsed because of 
England, is well known. England it was, too, that reserved 
for itself the use of dum-dum bullets. In January, 1900, the 
"Standard" was still exercised over the idea of neutral 
goods in neutral harbors being non-contraband. It called 
this an "extravagant proposal" and declared : "Our naval 
officers will continue to search suspicious ships in African 
waters, whatever nationality they may belong to. When 
necessary, damages will be paid." And as to the use of stink- 
ing gases, both England and the United States declared that 
they could not give them up 1 

In the face of these facts stands the shameless assertion 
of the "Accuser" that — "In the whole course of the con- 
ference, ever the same picture : England at the head of all 
efforts to lessen the intolerable burden of armament and to 
place the points of difference between civilized peoples more 
and more completely on a basis of justice. On the side of 
England — France, Russia, America, and, naturally, the 
smaller states. And on the opposite side, always, Germany, 
followed by Austria-Hungary." 

8 



We wish to contrast with this glorification of England 
a French view which appeared on July 19, 1899, the day on 
which the first Hague Conference was closed, and which 
waxes ironical over the attitude of England at the confer- 
ence, in the following cutting manner: "There are persons 
who do not love England; certainly they are in the wrong. 
England is a great liberal country, whose diplomacy has the 
highest respect for international agreements and binding 
promises. England is before all else concerned with secur- 
ing, from one pole to the other, the recognition of the eter- 
nal principles of humanity. England has made humanitar- 
ian sentiments an article of export, like alcohol, or cotton, 
and if it occasionally appears that England does not herself 
act upon the precepts which she urges upon others, this 
is merely due to her Christian humility." 

"England hates the bloody laurels that are plucked on the 
battlefield; the English work harder than any other people 
to realize the dream of eternal peace; nor will England ever 
be found to let a war loose upon the world, unless, of course, 
it is to England's advantage." 

"England desires that, in any case, the future wars shall 
take place under the most humane conditions imaginable, 
and would gladly deny its neighbors the use of dangerous 
weapons which can bring mourning to so many families in 
which England is interested. When the day comes when 
the European States wish to give up their armies, and more 
especially, to turn their navies into scrap-iron, England will 
not oppose them. Indeed it would be incompatible with the 
English love of freedom to interfere in such cases: If you 
grant them the liberty of arming themselves to the teeth, 
they have nothing against our being prohibited all weapons, 
even to the sword-stick. They found it, too, in very bad 
taste at the Hague Conference when an attempt was made 
to deny them the use of the dum-dum bullets, in their inter- 
course with weaker peoples. Do you know what the dum- 
dum bullets are? (There follows a description, which I 
omit). The English who have already tried out the benefi- 
cence of this invention on their subjects, the Hindus, are 
unwilling, in their zeal for the spread of civilization, to 
withhold it from the Boers also. According to a London 
despatch, 30 miltrailleuses, arranged for dum-dum cartridges, 
are being shipped to Capetown. In this, too, the humane 
spirit of our friends across the channel makes itself rec- 
ognized. One may actually hope that, thanks to the use of 
these instruments, the war against the Boers will not be of 
long duration and that the most absolute quiet will soon 
reign in the Transvaal. Therefore, since war is a scourge 
of the human race, England will, by avoiding long, bloody 
struggles, have once more taken over^-thanks to its good' 



ness of heart and the gentleness of its customs — the leader- 
ship of the peoples." 

The deep bitterness toward England which at that time 
ran through the whole of France brought matters in No- 
vember of that year to the point that France and Russia 
sounded us as to an alliance against England; and, because 
of the great sympathy of our people for the struggling 
Boers, a definite turning against England would, at the 
time, have been taken up in Germany with jubilation. 

What held us back from this was consideration for Eng- 
land and the very slight confidence with which, even at 
that time, this combination of allies was looked upon in 
many circles — as well as the fact that there was no direct 
interest of Germany's in question. And Emperor William 
remained firm as a rock in his resolve not to unsheathe 
the sword for any but German interests. 

What, moreover, could one expect of a Russian ally who 
shouted to us through his press that the entrance of Ger- 
many into the Russo-French combination would create the 
impression "of putting assafoetida into a fragrant bou- 
quet"^ and from a French ally whose foreign minister, Del- 
casse, made on the 24th of November, only a few months 
after the close of the Hague Conference, a speech which 
endeavored, with very little attempt at concealment, to 
strengthen in the French the hope of "Revenge" through 
Russia's help. 

But in February, 1900, Eduard Herve delivered, at the 
reception of Deschanel into the Academy, an address in 
which he ardently championed the idea of a Russian-French- 
English alliance, of which the result was to be "le partage 
de I'Allemagne."^ These were the shadows which the An- 
glo-French entente (being prepared by Delcasse, and des- 
tined to be the source of all the evil which has since over- 
taken Europe), cast before them. 

Of these things the "Accuser" with his smatterings of 
history, naturally knows nothing. 

We, however, consider it particularly worth while to 
linger over these first important stages of the world conflict 
which was preparing. 

The struggle of the English parties brings it to pass that 
occasionally the truth as to the motives and aims of English 
politics is clearly and strongly expressed. It is the Irish 
for the most part, who have taken it upon themselves to 
sharpen the conscience of the English; it is always with- 
out political results, but its value as witness to suppressed 
truth remains. At the very time when Deschanel, and 



i"Now. Wr." No. 8399. 

2Peb. 1, 1900. The speech of Deschanel which followed was 
even more poisonously anti-German; it also set up the ideal of 
an Anglo-Franco-Busslan Alliance pointed against Germany. 

10 



Herve were working up their enthusiasm over the idea of 
an alliance with England (in spite of Fashoda and in spite 
of Maskat), the Irish Nationalist, Timothy Michael Healy, 
delivered a speech in the House of Commons in which he 
was moved by the impression made by England's disgrace- 
ful defeats in the Transvaal, to remark that the English 
seemed to believe that the Almighty had given them a cer- 
tificate of title to the universe, and they therefore regarded 
every reverse they met with as a breach of contract. "But 
I do not believe" — he went on — ^"that the Good God will al" 
ways be English." In view of the treaties which England 
has broken, no nation can bank on England's sense of honor, 
so long as stock exchange diplomacy continues. They want 
to turn the whole world into a stock company, take the 
twelve apostles into their company, with limited liability, 
and to lift up their hands like the Pharisees and demand of 
the other nations that they rejoice over it."^ 

These were the moods which accompanied that Boer War 
which was fought under false colors — ostensibly for the free- 
ing of the Uitlanders, supposed to have been injured by the 
Boers, but really for the winning of the goldfields of the 
Rand and the diamond fields of the Orange Republic, whose 
riches so intoxicated the imaginations of the English kings 
of finance that they regarded every opposition to the attain- 
ment of this goal 33 a crime against humanity. For Eng- 
land is humanity.^ This psychological atmosphere it is 
which provides the explanation for the fact that when, in 
November, 1900, the Boers were showing a power of resist- 
ance which the English had considered impossible, the 
"Standard" could write : "The burning of the farms and 
the wasting of the lands of the refractory Boers seems not 
to have had the necessary effect. But there are other meas- 
ures by which agitators and midnight murderers can be 
brought to submission, and these measures must be resorted 
to without delay. The lives of British soldiers are some- 
what more valuable than those of Dutch rebels!!"^ 

The World Alliance Against Germany. 

The period between the first and the second Hague Con- 
ference, that is, between May, 1899, and July, 1907, is dis- 

iThis, in answer to the "Accuser" who has the audacity to 
maintain that we have taken over the ancient Jewish idea of 
being the chosen people of God. This notion, in all its grotes- 
que onesidedness, has, on the contrary, remained since the 
days of Cromwell, specificially English. Compare on this point 
the highly characteristic remarks of Sir Roger Casement, 
"England's Achilles Heel." (Berlin, 1915. pp. 32 33.) 

^In passing be it remarked that from 1895 until after the 
Boxer uprising the English firm of "Kaynochs Munitions Co," 
supplied China with guns and ammunition; and the head of 
this firm was Arthur Chamberlain, brother of Joseph Chamber- 
lain. 

^Thls saying should be incorporated in the coat of arms 
which England will undoubtedly grant to the new English 
Field Marshal, Botha. 

a 



posed of by the "Accuser" in less than four pages. He 
thereby suppresses three facts which, together with the 
Morocco question, have determined the destinies of the 
world; and as to the conflict over Morocco — it was a crisis 
which had a permanent effect on world politics and particu- 
larly on Anglo-German relations. 

The reference is, of course, to the Anglo-Japanese treaty 
of alliance of January 30, 1902, whereby England again took 
up the plan of attacking Russia, which had been frustrated 
by the Czar's disarmament proposal of 1898; the co-opera- 
tion of the English and German fleets against Venezuela 
from December, 1902, to May, 1903; and, third, the con- 
clusion of the Anglo-French Entente on the 8th of April, 
1904, which Delcasse and Lord Lansdowne signed. 

In view of the present world situation a detailed exposi- 
tion is not required of how the Anglo-Japanese alliance not 
only justified itself as a means of annihilating (or shall we 
say "disarming after the English fashion") the Russian sea 
power, but also proved serviceable as a ready instrument 
for the disposing of England's troublesome German com- 
petitor. 

It has remained less in the memory of the present gen- 
eration that it is from the co-operation of England and 
Germany against the violent tyranny of Castro in Venezuela 
(which defied all justice and all the obligations he had en- 
tered into), that that practice of casting suspicion on Ger- 
many, which has never since let up, is to be dated. Then it 
was that the watchword of a world alliance against Germany 
was first given out by the politicians of the "National Re- 
view"; and it is characteristic that, in spite of the points of 
political antagonism between England and Russia, which 
were becoming ever sharper, English and Russian journal- 
ists^ were agreed that the co-operation of these two rivals 
was the necessary perquisite to the attainment of this ideal. 

As the third member of their alliance, both these coun- 
tries considered the nation which for centuries had been 
Germany's antagonist — France. In the French cabinet, ever 
since the late autumn of 1898, there was felt the decisive 
influence of a man whose thoughts were directed toward 
creating a political situation which should offer France the 
opportunity for that "Revenge" for which it yearned so 
eagerly. M. Delcasse, whom we herewith introduce as the 
first organizer of the world war, M. Delcasse, who man- 
aged to hold his own in five successive ministries of diverg- 
ent political tendencies as director of the foreign policy of 
France — M. Delcasse could not, directly after the impres- 



^They were, to name only the most poisonous members of 
this group of conspirators, Messrs. Maxse, Blennerhasset, Wes- 
selitzki and Tatischtschew. That the French, however, have a 
prior claim on the idea has already been mentioned. 



sion made by the Fashoda Affair, think of stretching a 
friendly hand toward England. So he took up the idea, 
very popular in France at that time, of a union of the Latin 
races under French leadership. Camille Barrere, ambassa- 
dor at Rome since 1899, identified his ambition with that of 
Delcasse, and their combined efforts succeeded, despite 
Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance, in inducing the 
Zanardelli Ministry, in which Prinetti was foreign minister, 
to sign an agreement, of which Italy's betrayal of its allies 
was one of the consequences. 

It will be useful to follow through to its final consequences 
this French-Italian intrigue in which Russia, too, and Eng- 
land were later drawn in as assistant seducers. 

A speech of Barrere's on January 1, 1902, first called the 
attention of the world to the fact that a change in the 
grouping of the powers was preparing. What became known 
was this, that agreements were exchanged between France 
and Italy which, to permit of Italy's later establishing itself 
in Tripoli, forbade France to advance east of Tunis; and 
that England had granted the Italians considerable conces- 
sions in the matter of Tripoli's eastern border. Thus Crispi's 
plan of receiving a compensation for Italy's renunciation to 
Tunis seemed to be brought close to realization. 

In reality, the Italian-French agreement of 1902 had a 
much wider scope. It appears that the price Italy paid for 
the concessions made to her, was the obligation to hold 
herself neutral in a war between Germany and France. The 
subordination to France in which Italy thereby placed her- 
self showed itself first at the Algeciras Conference, and then 
through the fact that, when the Russian-French affiliation 
broadened out into a Triple Entente, England and Russia 
also entered into such intimate relations with Italy that the 
Triple Alliance became, in fact, an illusion. In October, 
1909, were concluded those arrangements between Italy and 
Russia at Racconigi, whereby the former was made secretly 
to serve the Russian policies in the Near Orient ; and that 
the position of Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance, to 
which the epithet "equivocal" could hardly be applied any 
longer, was completely undermined. 

Then in the year 1911, when Italy's war against Turkey 
broke out, the contents of Italy's agreement with France — 
which had still been kept strictly secret — revealed them- 
selves through the fact that the troops sent to Tripoli were 
not taken from the neutral Swiss, nor from the Austrian, 
but from the French frontier, which was completely de- 
nuded of Italian troops. From this it was correctly con- 
cluded by those within the Triple Entente that henceforth 
the point of issue would be the winning over of Italy to 
an active co-operation with the enemies of Germany and 
Austria. The point of attack became Albania, where Italy 

13 



was pledged, in case of war, to act hand in hand with 
Austria, and, if it came to the point of defending the prin- 
ciple of Albania's integrity, to give Austria armed help. In 
the negotiations over this matter, in which it appears that 
Iswolski took part, directly or indirectly, it was represented 
to the Italians that in 1902, and again at Racconigi, they 
had assumed obligations which were inconsistent with an 
advocacy and support of Austria's interests. And it was 
very forcibly brought home to the Italians that France and 
Russia would stand firmly together in case of a far-reaching 
Austro-Serbian conflict. 

Iswolski became convinced that Italy believed it could 
get better support for its designs from the powers of the 
Entente than from its allies. In Petersburg and Paris, 
therefore, it was no longer considered immediately neces- 
sary to work for a secession of Italy from the Triple Al- 
liance; the existing relationship, in which Italy practically 
paralyzed the policies of the others, seemed in every way 
more advantageous. And such was, in truth, the state of 
things which existed up to the time of Italy's break with 
her two allies. The Italian diplomats could hardly do enough 
to show their confidence in their friends of the Entente, 
and at the same time suffered the Italian General Staff to 
discuss with our own, military measures in the event of a 
war. Even at that time it was a non plus ultra of per- 
fidy. Ssassonow's stay in Paris in August, 1912, only a few 
months after the "unchanged" renewal of the Triple Alliance 
had been arranged between Secretary of State von Kider- 
len-Wachter and San Giuliano, and a quarter of a year be- 
fore the renewal became a fact, resulted, because of the 
good relations in which France and Russia stood to Italy, 
in a cessation of efforts to make Italy join the Entente. 
It was no secret that the existing "relation of confidence" 
was considered more useful. That the French were never- 
theless distrustful of Italy can be readily understood, since 
they knew that they were dealing with a friend who was 
very free of bias, and who might easily make a new change 
of front. In the summer of 1913 the French had, as the 
passionate polemics in the "Temps," "Debats" and "Matin" 
showed, a suspicion that Italy might, in the end, and in spite 
of everything, cause a shift of the balance of power in the 
Mediterranean for the benefit of the Triple Alliance. Noth- 
ing but repeated, clear-cut declaration that the Triple Al- 
liance treaty had in no way been altered, had a pacifying 
effect. This was held in Paris to indicate that Italy con- 
sidered itself now as before, bound by its arrangement with 
France. 

In July, 1914, the hostility with which the Russian press 
attacked Prince William of Albania seems to have resulted 
in increased friendliness between Russia and Italy; at any 

14 



r 4. 4.Uof <-v.<» Italians were at that time not dis- 

for Italy as well. 
Further ir,dications of the faithless and treacherous pohcy 

11", T'J'tl .1.; 'p,"Ul."y Hi,.o„ .f ,<•■, Crl„e- o 

Austria-Hungary. Wliere is 

The "Accuser," to be sure, raises the question. Where is 

thi proof that France wished us harm? He denies that in 

T?,?.sia there exists a "hatred of Germany nourished on Pan- 

"lust''; to h m the Triple Entente is a harmless defen- 

JvIllHance- and the annexation of Bosnia and the Her- 

rgo;inrdoi;e'w1th the approval and the Previous permis- 

• ^( T?,iccia a challenge to Russia and bervia, aespnc 

Bosnia and the Herzegovina as everyone knows^Jormed 
^ PT °t ^Rt^sia^^ind Turket- n c:n.eTo"r;aH"e t\at 

HQ 1R78 , .» 

Indeed because of the superficiality of the "Accusers 
hi toAfa'l k^rwledge, and this un-'entifi=^ jnetho of mves- 
fixation which consists of bringing together scatterea irag 
rr-^f^arious UansacHon^ and arra^^^^^^^^ 

^rthTcrime'- is to be condemned as completely worthless. 



15 



and whose substance he imparts to the world in the form of 
judicial pronouncements. 

These verdicts of the "Accuser" — who at the same time 
sets up as judge, are as follows: 

"Austria is guilty, alone, or in common with others, of 
having brought on the European war." 

"Germany is guilty, in common with Austria, of having 
brought on the European war." 

"Against England I can find no grounds for an accusa- 
tion. Sir Edward Grey has earned, as no one else has, the 
title 'Peacemaker of Europe.' His efforts were in vain, but 
his merit in having worked for the maintenance of peace 
with untiring zeal, with cleverness and energy, will remain 
ineffaceable in history." 

"Russia is completely innocent of the European war, and 
the guilt falls on Germany and Austria alone." 

"France." This section is a hymn in praise of the French 
diplomacy, and starts out with the sentence, "L'Empire d'Al- 
lemagne supportera devant I'histoire I'ecrasante responsa- 
bilite."^ 

Thus in contrast with the verdicts of "guilty" against 
Germany and Austria-Hungary stand the verdicts acquitting 
England, Russia and France. Whoever, by overwhelming 
proof, converts the latter into their opposite, thereby also 
annuls the former verdicts of this "German" against his 
fatherland and against Austria-Hungary. It will therefore 
suffice to look into these "acquittals," which contrast with 
the unanimous "conviction" of all Germany — with the sole 
exception of this quasi-German. We begin with France, 
reminding the reader of all those accusing circumstances, 
which we have already presented, in referring to the attitude 
of Italy. 

Two Heretics of France. 

Let two unofficial French voices now familiarize us with 
the sentiments which were prevalent in those circles of 
educated France not under English domination at the time 
of the serious political crises of the years 1905 and 1911. 
They coincide almost entirely with those views — prevalent 
(as I have learned through the correspondence with French 
patriots that I have kept up for many years), during the 
years 1913 and in 1914 before the outbreak of the war — 
which recognized in the deliberate efforts on the part of 
the leading French politicians to make the German-French 
relations critical and, in France's growing dependence on 
those elements in Petersburg and London which made for 
war, a misfortune and a danger of everincreasing imminence. 

Toward the end of the year 1906 appeared the book by 

^Indeed, it is characteristic that at every opportunity the 
"Accuser" parades his smatterings of French. 

16 



Emile Flourens. "La France conquise. Edward VII et 
Clemenceau." Flourens was foreign minister in the Goblet 
Ministry from December, 1886, to April 4, 1888, and was also 
a member of the later ministries of Rouvier and Tirard. 

As deputy he always sat in the ranks of the moderate 
republicans. His book is a burning protest against the depen- 
dence on the English diplomacy in which Edward VII had 
placed the French by converting first Delcasse and then Cle- 
menceau into tools for the attainment of his ends. Flourens 
reproaches the King with having, insofar as in his power lay, 
disturbed the good relations existing between Germany and 
Russia, in which he recognized a hostage to peace, and with 
using the remaining continental powers as pawns in order 
to checkmate Germany. The efforts of Emperor William to 
achieve closer relations with England he consciously frus- 
trated, and finally succeeded in making Morocco the brand 
that lit the fires of dissension between France and Germany. 
And after the fall of Delcasse, says this writer, he made 
every effort, through Clemenceau, to turn France into a "sol- 
dier of England." No one could emphasize the aggressive 
tendency of the Franco-English combination directed against 
Germany, more strongly than Flourens does. And the Rus- 
sian press, too, began, as far back as that, to put itself at 
the service of this policy. On the 17th of March, 1906, there 
appeared in the Petersburg "Russ" a Paris letter in which it 
was literally stated: "I learn from a reliable source that 
during his stay in Paris King Edward expressed the desire 
that a military convention be concluded between England 
and France. It is said that his wish was sympathetically 
received. The election of Clemenceau (Minister of the In- 
terior in the Sarien Cabinet, President of the Ministry, No- 
vember, 1906, to July, 1909) is agreeable to the Liberal Eng- 
lish cabinet; it will result in bringing England and France 
still closer together. For his English sympathies are well 
known. The 'entente cordiale' beams ever brighter. And 
that, too, is what Sir Edward Grey has declared to his col- 
leagues." 

Nor were these Petersburg circles blind to the fact that 
closer relations between Russia and England through their 
French ally, were also set in motion by these events. 

Nearly five years passed since Flourens had sounded his 
alarm in "La France conquise." It died away without the 
slightest effect. The advances England was making to France 
had in the meanwhile, taken on a more and more definite 
character. The sole protesting voice, raised by the "Eclair" 
every week in the Waverly Articles under the title "I'Angle- 
terre inconnue," may have sharpened the political conscience 
of many a Frenchman, but since these articles were not only 
strictly Catholic in tendency, but also monarchistic in tone, 
an influence on the ruling group was out of the question. 

17 



Those who belonged to this group in France were, without 
exception, anti-clerical, and belonged to the Freemasons. 
"Grand Orient" at that time (1909) numbered 25,000 members, 
the "Grande Loge de France" 5,000, and the fact that King 
Edward was the head of the English Freemasons, who stood 
in the closest relations with their French and Italian broth- 
ers, helped very materially to increase the English influence 
in France. The Platonic connection of the German Free- 
masonry with these organizations, whose "humanity" was 
directed against backward Germany, resulted in a duping of 
the Germans similar to that which resulted from the fra- 
ternizing of the German Social Democrats with their "com- 
rades" in England and France. 

Now, it is very characteristic that England, which at the 
very time of the peace negotiations at Portsmouth renewed 
its alliance with Japan, was at the same time endeavoring to 
approach Russia again; and, above all things, to prevent the 
formation of more intimate relations between us and Rus- 
sia, which had been feared since the meeting between Em- 
peror William and the Czar at Bjorko. After the great ser- 
vices which Germany had rendered its Russian neighbor dur- 
ing the Japanese war and during the Revolution, this com- 
bination most dreaded by England, appeared not improbable 
to those who had no conception of the fact that anti-Ger- 
man tendencies penetrated even to the immediate entour- 
age of the Czar; and that the Russian intellectuals, always 
moving from one extreme to the other, were in procss of 
converting their ideals of freedom into an unbridled nation- 
alism. 

Nor must it be overlooked that the Algeciras conference 
which passed off without destroying the world peace, led 
to that revolution in naval policy which, through the build- 
ing of the first dreadnaught announced a new era in naval 
warfare. 

The first success of English diplomacy in the direction 
of Russia was the agreement of the two powers on the 
division of Persia into spheres of influence at the end of 
August, 1907; this was designed above all else — so much is 
now certain, and the result has demonstrated it — to make 
of Persia the booty by means of which Russia should be led 
to an understanding with England over the great questions 
of European politics. The chain of intrigues which thence- 
forth were woven in Teheran, were always directed from 
the English side with a view to this end. The consequence 
was a forbearance (in questions that Great Britain had till 
then regarded as a noli me tangere), which did not lack a 
certain comic aspect, and which was masterfully taken ad- 
vantage of by Hartwig the Russian envoy to Persia at that 
time. 

There followed the great crisis of the year 1908. It was 

18 



this very year which seemed to all the friends of peace to 
promise the best prospects for the future. In Berlm a com- 
mittee was formed for the creation of more friendly relations 
between the French and Germans; the boundary difficulties 
between German and French Camerun were adjusted by a 
treaty the North Sea and Baltic Treaty guaranteed to the 
powers that had possessions on the coasts their status; and 
it could be taken as a sign of growing confidence m the tinal 
disappearance of the campaign against Germany which had 
principally been carried on by the English press that in 
May and June South German burgomasters first, then IJU 
German pastors paid a visit to England, and found there 
a hospitable, and, in part, an enthusiastically friendly re- 
ception. . 

Parallel with these things, to be sure, were symptoms 
which could not help but be disquieting. Agents led by an 
English Balkan Committee, at whose head stood the member 
of Parliament, Noel Buxton, arranged for a Bulgarian-Turk- 
ish war, and in May it became known that King Edward VII 
was about to pay the Czar a visit. The previous conference 
of the King with Clemenceau and Pichon at Biarritz had 
been disquieting enough. Against his journey to ?"^sia a 
protest was made in the House of Commons by 57 Radicals, 
because they viewed with distrust, and not without reason, 
the meddling of the King in world politics. The protest was 
defeated by a great majority; but what sort of hopes the 
enemies of Germany were pinning to this journey was shown 
by an article in the "Golos Moskwy" (of May 31, 1908) which, 
as the organ of Gutschkow at that time reflected the opinions 
of very powerful circles. The visit of Edward VII was des- 
tined, it was said, to lead up to a Russian-Enghsh alliance. 
'Tf it is assumed that this alliance will become a reality,^ and 
will direct its point against Germany, the latter's position 
would certainly be most difficult. Pressed back, from the 
west and the east, by the armies of Russia and France, cut 
off from the sea by the English fleet, it would fall into diffi- 
culties from which a way out could hardly be found. The 
pictures of Europe's political life change from day to day, 
and perhaps we shall witness the realization of that grandiose 
plan of Edward VII whose final aim is the peaceful isolation 
of Germany." . 

The use of the word "peaceful" was conscious hypocrisy, 
for even then the Russians wanted war, but out of consid- 
eration for the Czar, who could not be initiated into the 
ultimate aims of the great conspiracy which was preparing* 
an attempt was made to keep alive in the public mind the 
notion that, in the face of the powerful combination of 
England, Russia and France we would, without a struggle, 
submit to the dictates of the Three, and that each of them 
would, without much expense, arrive at the goal of their 

19 



desires: — the possession of Constantinople and the Darda- 
nelles by Russia, the reincorporation of Alsace Lorraine by- 
France and the capture of the German fleet by England. 

The leading politicians of the three powers were not so 
optimistic in their reckonings; they knew that it would not 
pass off without a struggle. When, on June 9th, King Edward 
met the Czar off Reval, he took with him Sir Charles Har- 
dinge, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, and Nicol- 
son; Iswolski, Stolypin and two secretaries of state accom- 
panied the Czar. What it was that Czar and King discussed 
has not become known, and was probably of no great conse- 
quence, but Hardinge and Iswolski assuredly came to an 
understanding as to their plans for the future. By word of 
mouth, only — in strict pursuance of the consistent general 
instruction of Grey; but the result of the negotiations was 
communicated to the diplomatic representatives of Eng- 
land and Russia, and later came, circuitously, to our knowl- 
edge. Iswolski declared himself ready to proceed with 
England against Germany, as soon as Russia should have 
sufficiently strengthened itself in a military way. Six to 
eight years was the longest period contemplated for this 
purpose, that is to say, till between the years 1914 and 
1916. As long as Clemenceau remained in office, it could be 
reckoned on that France would, under all circumstances 
join in. A rather long period of military preparations for 
the three powers was, of course, contemplated. 

Furthermore an agitation was begun in England im- 
mediately after the days at Reval for the concentration of 
the channel fleet in the North Sea. There appeared that 
book of Percival A. Hislam which caused such a stir, "The 
Admiralty of the Atlantic"; in Russia the Imperial Council 
approved the four armored cruisers voted down by the 
Duma; England and Russia entered with fresh energy on 
a movement for reforms in Macedonia; and the English 
fleet manoeuvres between the Channel Fleet and the Home 
Fleet in the North Sea, close to our borders, already bore 
the character of a demonstration, not to say of a threat. 
This impression was increased by the visit which the Presi- 
dent of the French Republic paid to the Czar in Reval at 
the end of July. Fallieres took with him Clemenceau and 
his foreign minister, Pichon. There followed shortly after- 
wards in Ischl a meeting of King Edward with Emperor 
Francis Joseph, whom, as later became known, the King 
endeavored to introduce into his political constellation, an 
endeavor that was notoriously unsuccessful. To this chain 
of machinations there belongs the final fact, that King Ed- 
ward conferred on August 25th at Marienbad with Clem- 
enceau and Iswolski. 

Meanwhile the fruits of the English agitation in Bulgaria 
had ripened to such an extent that a Bulgarian-Turkish war 

20 



seemed unavoidable, and there seemed every likelihood 
that a partition of Turkey would be the result, and that the 
great powers immediately interested, Austria, Russia and 
England would profit thereby. Russia had since May, 1908, 
been engaging in negotiations with Austria, which, pro- 
ceeding from the question of the building of a railroad in 
the Balkans and on the Adriatic Sea, led up finally to 
Russia's being ready to adopt a favorable attitude toward 
the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; in return for 
which Austria promised to take her troops out of the 
Sandschak Nowibazar directly after the annexation had 
been proclaimed. Austria furthermore declared itself ready 
to enter into a confidential exchange of opinions with Rus- 
sia concerning Constantinople and the Dardanelles. That 
was the agreement arrived at on the 27th of August be- 
tween Aehrenthal and Iswolski at Buchlau and Som- 
merang. 

It is not definitely known how Turkey got word of this 
agreement. It is certain that she regarded the meetings at 
Reval with the greatest distrust, and highly probable that 
the Young Turks in Paris also got wind of further plans. 
The Revolution of July 24, 1908, and the proclamation of 
the Turkish constitution was the countermove, and had, as 
a direct consequence, that England went over, with flying 
colors, into the camp of "parliamentary" Turkey. Thus 
began a new stage of the oriental question, which was in- 
troduced by the proclamation of the independence of Bul- 
garia, by the acceptance of the title of Czar by Ferdinand, 
and by the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and 
which led to a serious European crisis which reached its 
highest point in March, 1909. 

Since, in the meanwhile, it had become clear that England 
had no inclination to allow the question of Constantinople 
and the Dardanelles to be taken up, Iswolski was seized 
by the notion that he had been duped in Buchlau by 
Aehrenthal. His hate was directed against his Austrian 
fellow-diplomat; Russia identified itself with the Servian 
claims, and that led to a diplomatic campaign which came 
near ending in a European war, and was accompanied by a 
press campaign of almost unexampled bitterness. It was, 
moreover, directed not only against Austria-Hungary, but 
also against Germany. Russia, England, France, and even 
Italy (in spite of the fact that Tittoni had been kept in- 
formed by Iswolski of the negotiations at Buchlau) raised 
protests against the annexation of Bosnia and the Herze- 
govina. A royal council in Vienna decided on the 17th of 
March to call in the reserves, a Russian-Austrian war 
seemed inevitable; when finally, on the 25th of March, 
1909, Russia condescended to recognize, without reserve, 
the annexed territory as part of the Habsburg monarchy. 

21 



England's Panic of 1909. 

On the German side this campaign was led by Kider- 
len-Wachter. He prevented the annexation question from 
being dragged on to the forum of an international confer- 
ence; our emperor left no room for doubt that Germany 
considered itself bound by its treaty obligations in case of 
a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary, and finally brought it 
about that all the powers recognized the annexation and 
renounced the idea of a conference. Sir Edward Grey, to 
be sure, muttered resentfully. It has become known that 
he reproached the Petersburg cabinet very emphatically 
because of its attitude which had, in effect, been peaceful. 
It was not he, however, but Kiderlen, who carried the day. 
That was to be rated the more highly, as he simultane- 
ously brought to a happy conclusion (by the agreement 
of February 9th) the Moroccan question which had again 
been brought to a head through the Casablanca conflict. 
Despite all this, and although the attitude of Germany had 
been in all points loyal and correct, the hate of England 
and Russia was especially directed against us. In Eng- 
land it took the form of a panic lasting from February to 
June, 1909, was caused by the invention of the airship by 
Count Zeppelin, brought with it a veritable orgy of pas> 
sionate attacks through the press, and aimed at the annihi- 
lation of the German fleet. 

"Two weeks, perhaps two days" — wrote the "Standard" 
at that time — "would suffice to destroy the Kaiser's sea 
power, and once that is removed from the world, the peace 
of Europe is assured." The "Morning Post" said: "We are 
still in a position to destroy the German war fleet and to 
ruin completely the enormous and increasing German com- 
merce. But if we let things go on until 1912, the advantage 
will be on the German side!" At that time "Nineteenth 
Century," "Fortnightly Review," "National Review" wrote, 
and English statesmen such as Admiral Fitzgerald and 
Lord Charles Beresford spoke in the same spirit, some- 
times in tones even more poisonous. It was really as 
though the whole nation had for the time lost its senses 
and all feeling for its own dignity. 

But eventually the excited temperament of these "In- 
sulars" wore itself out, and there occurred, as in England 
so often happens, a sudden change of sentiment. As early 
as the end of 1908 a member of Parliament, Mr. H. Side- 
botham, had pointed out, in the Reform Club at Manches- 
ter, that the constant interference of the King in foreign 
politics was no longer to be endured. In June, 1909, a visit 
of English clergymen to Berlin showed that it was already 
possible to escape from the general suggestion. A few 
days later a meeting of the Czar with Emperor William 

22 



took place, and the table talk which was exchanged on 
hat o'c casion permitted the conclusion t^at Russia woud 
not allow herself to be used as an ally of the French 
"Revenge" or of the English politic of pamc ^ 

Finally came the fall of the Clemenceau Ministry and 
the new Briand Ministry appeared to look with little favor 
on the plans which the English had by no means aban. 
doned; so that a fresh meeting of Edward VII with Clem- 
enceau at Marienbad made an almost funeral impression 
The campaign at Racconigi in October was Iswolskis las 
important act as foreign minister. At the end of the year 
he was appointed member of the Imperial Council, The 
Russian press had attacked him violently, and the Czar 
looked about for his successor. Negotiations w^th bsas- 
sonow, the Russian ambassador at Rome, for the taking 
over of the ministry, had already begun several months 
before; yet they did not, until October, 1910 reach their 
conclusion, which resulted in Iswolski's transfer to Paris^ 
where he was thenceforth the centre of all the efforts to 
influence public opinion against Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, and, in particular, exercised a most Pemicious 
influence by bribing the Paris press, ^^'[^^^y anti-German 
enough. There can be no doubt that his bitter hatred of 
Aehrenthal was one of the springs of his activity. 

The year 1910 then passed through contradictory poli- 
tical currents. The English electoral campaign, whose re- 
sult seemed to assure the Liberal cabinet its position for a 
long time to come, was conducted by means of a barefaced 
misuse of the watchword: an "Imminent German Peril. 
In London and Petersburg an agitation was started tor the' 
withdrawal of English and Russian deposits in Germany, 
the Delcassean tendencies again won ground, and the 
storm which had been brewing since February on the Bal- 
kan Peninsula increased the political nervousness, ihere 
were however, side by side with the voices which urged 
a strengthening of the English armed forces, through the 
introducution of universal compulsory service, others which 
made themselves heard, these, in view of the ever more 
threatening recurring danger of a universal war, preached 
reconciliation. In the "Empire Review" Edward Dicey 
wrote: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of 
Europe is assured, but if the two nations fall out, it will 
be a most unhappy day for mankind." In the "Semschts- 
china" a respectable journalist. Glinka, championed the 
view 'that it would be madness for Russia to decide for 
England if it were a question of chosing between England 
and Germany. And as to France, my political friends 
there wrote me that the public opinion of the country 
wished to preserve peace, and was resolved not to go with 
England. 



23 



Such was the situation when on May 6, 1910, King Ed- 
ward died and with George V a personality took hold of the 
rudder who had till then stood aloof from politics and 
as to whose pacific sentiments there was the less doubt 
in Germany as the King stood in the best of personal rela- 
tions to his Imperial cousin. The journey of Emperior 
William to London for the funeral of Edward VII seemed 
to have strengthened these friendly relations still more. 
But it was worth bearing in mind that the "Temps," in the 
obituary dedicated to Edward VII, expressly admitted that 
the King carried through the Anglo-French Entente over 
the heads of both governments, and that at that time the 
same paper was protesting violently against the dislodging 
of the Russian troops along the German and Austrian 
frontiers. Unfortunately it was these hostile voices, and 
not the peaceful elements, which possessed the decisive 
influence. King George was as little of an independent 
political reality as Nicholas II. Just as the latter was not 
able to bring more than temporary opposition to bear 
against chauvinistic influences, and was under the thumb 
of the war party led by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikol- 
ajewitch\ so George V was unable to escape the influence 
of the three men who carried on the traditions of Edward 
VII: Asquith, Grey, 'Churchill. The visit of Nicolas II, 
with his new foreign minister Ssassonow, at Potsdam, and 
the Potsdam treaty of November 4, 1911, resulted, as a 
matter of fact, only in the semblance of an improvement in 
the German-Russian relations. Ssassonow, after his re- 
turn to Petersburg, deliberately put the contents of the 
treaty before the Russian public in a false light, when he 
declared to the "Nowoje Wremja" that Germany had re- 
nounced all interest in Balkan politics. That was the more 
conscientiousless, as at that very time a new crisis was in 
preparation both in Morocco and in the Balkans. 

Francis Delaisi's "La Guerre Qui Vient." 

About this time there appeared in Paris a companion 
piece to "La France conquise" by Flourens, the brochure 
by Francis Delaisi, "La guerre qui vient." It reached the 
bookshops in May, 1911, but was at once bought up and 
destroyed by the French government. There was too much 
dangerous truth presented by Delaisi to the limited under- 
standing of the common herd of the French, and so this 
insignificant bit of writing passed practically unnoticed. 
But a copy of it was retained in Switzerland, and in 1914, 

iPrincess Militza of Montenegro, wife of the Grand Duke 
Peter Nikolajewitch, worked in the same direction. To the 
war party there also belonged the notorious leader-writer of 
the "Nowoje Wremja,'" Pilenko, the Czarina Mother, and 
Iswolski, who, by his settling in Paris, had gained even 
greater influence. 

24 



after the outbreak of the war, there appeared a new edi- 
tion, to which we owe our knowledge of one of the most 
remarkable bits of political soothsaying. 

Delaisi is a socialist, and became known through two 
earlier books, "La force allemande," "La Democratie et les 
Financiers," of which only the titles are known to me. 
"La guerre qui vient," however, indicates that he is a man 
who really has something to say. The picture he draws of 
the world war which he expected and would, if in any way 
possible, have liked to prevent, bears an astonishing like- 
ness to the reality that we are today experiencing. Delaisi 
perceived quite correctly in May, 1911, that England was 
about to repeat the "coup" of 1905— that is to say, the 
shoving of France into the Moroccan adventure. He de- 
clared that Delcasse became member of this Monis Min- 
istry, as minister of Marine, in order to conclude a military 
convention which was calculated to bind France to Eng- 
land permanently. For the Island Kingdom, conquered on 
the industrial field, had resolved to take up arms. The 
policy of isolation, said Delaisi, which began in 1903 with 
the journeys of Edward VII, was now completed: France 
was won through Morocco, Russia through the sacrifice of 
Persia, Italy was being led to defection from its allies by 
the offer of Tripoli and Albania, and through the encour- 
agement of the Young Turks, the friend of Germany, Ab- 
dul Hammid, had successfully been put out of the way. 
England had been building up her fleet of dreadnaughts 
since 1905. He pointed out that the former naval base at 
Plymouth, directed against France, had now given place 
to Dover and Rosyth, from whose fortified harbors the 
German war fleet was to be destroyed and German com- 
merce once for all put an end to. The British colonies had 
already been drawn into participation in this patriotic work. 
There could be no doubt of it — England meant to return 
to her old corsair tactics and to the system of blockading 
the continent. The naval manoeuvres of 1909 and 1910 
were, he said, a sort of dress-rehearsal, and the consterna- 
tion was immense when the fleet that represented the en- 
emy succeeded in escaping through the Channel undam- 
aged. But even assuming that England could succeed in 
carrying out her plan of blocking the mouth of the Weser 
and of the Elbe, and to capture off the north coast of 
Scotland or the Channel every merchant ship returnmg to 
Germany, the final goal, he declared, would not have been 
reached. Germany could conduct her ships lying in for- 
eign harbors to Rotterdam and Antwerp under neutral 
flag, and so keep its commerce alive. For that reason 
England meant to blockade the Schelde as well, and, since 
the cannon of Flushing command the entrance, she must 

25 



prevent the fortifications of city and harbor that were 
planned, by bringing powerful pressure to bear on Holland. 
From all this it follows that Antwerp would have to be- 
come the objective in the struggle. England could only 
triumph if it closed up Antwerp; Germany could only 
maintain itself if it held this harbor open. 

Delaisi then assumes that, Germany, foreseeing the immi- 
nent peril, will concentrate its fleet off Flushing, and simul- 
taneously direct an army corps against Antwerp, where- 
upon there would be nothing left for the English, but to 
land troops in Belgium and throw the Prussians back 
across the Meuse and the Rhine. 

He pointed out that Kitchener had already said: "The 
frontier of the British Empire in Europe is not the Pas de 
Calais, but the line of the Meuse." But to land troops one 
must be master of an army that can measure itself against 
the German, and that explains how the cry for universal 
compulsory military service could be raised in England. 
But as it met with no response, the eyes of the English 
turned toward France. "We have," they said, "not enough 
soldiers, but France has soldiers. Over there, across the 
Pas de Calais, there is a large, well-schooled and disci- 
plined army; it is well armed and able to defy the Ger- 
mans. The French are brave and warlike; they love war, 
and understand how to wage it. When the grand phrases 
'honneur national,' 'interets superieurs de la Patrie et de la 
civilisation,' are whispered to them, then they will march 
forward. We must therefore try to get the French army 
for ourselves." 

"That cannot be very difficult. The French democracy 
is merely an outward appearance. This people is in reality 
ruled by an oligarchy of financiers and owners of iron foun- 
dries, upon whom press and politicians are dependent. We 
will deal with these persons, promise them a large war 
loan, through which their banks will receive large com- 
missions, we will pledge ourselves to give them the chance 
to construct a few railways in Turkey, or to provide them 
with big enterprises in Syria, Ethiopia or in Morocco. 

"For a few millions they will sell us the whole French 
army." 

Thus did these good people think the matter out; and 
their wire-pullers got to work. 

As early as 1903, when the war for the Transvaal had 
scarcely been liquidated, Edward VII arrived in Paris, and 
all the dear boobies who had yelled so loud, "Long live 
Kruger," now learned, through the press that they 'must 
shout "Vive I'Angleterre." 

To reward us, the London cabinet magnanimously gave 
us, in return for Egypt, whose financial supervision be- 

26 



longed to us, Morocco, which did not belong to England. 
And at all the banquets one toasted the Entente cordiale. 

But that did not suffice. 

As Delcasse, who in 1905 wanted to force us into a war 
with Germany, was overthrown, England understood that 
it was necessary to be wary. She waited until the friend 
and messmate of Edward VII again came to power. He 
became— accidentally as it were— Minister of Marine, and 
—also as if by accident— it was announced, directly before 
his appointment, that negotiations were being taken up 
between London and Paris concerning a military agreement. 

''Naturally this agreement is to be 'defensive.' But how 
easy will it be for the British government to force Ger- 
many to a declaration of war by the blockading of Ant- 

"^^'And then we, the French, will march into the lowlands 
of Belgium and get broken heads, not for the King ot 
Prussia, but this time for the King of England. 

The question of how the French people, which wished 
for nothing more ardently than the maintenance of peace, 
are to be dragged into the war arranged by England is, 
Tys DelLt eSy to answer. For the plan is already fin- 
ished, and may any day be put into practice. The military 
convention at present being negotiated provides that m 
case of war the British fleet shall protect the French coasts 
while the French army shall proceed against Antwerp^ In 
Trder to move the French peasants to go freely into the 
field it will be impressed upon them that the Prussians 
wak; up^very morning with the thought of marching into 
France The venal press will exaggerate every disturb- 
ance vide Nancy!) until the idea of -German peril sM^ 
have taken fast root. Then when some fine day the English 
fleets set themselves in motion, and German troops ad- 
vance simultaneously toward ^^^werp, it will be said th^^^ 
the neutrality of Belgium has been violated, and the Prus- 
sian army is advancing against Lille. 

Here we discontinue our report on the leading ideas of 
Delaisi. He considered it possible for France to remain 
neutral in a German-English war, if it would ^^^^^^^o ^end 
the English its troops and to lend us the rnoney which we 
would need for our preparations for war. The foni^er would 
have been quite sufficient to preserve peace, for without 
French help England would not have dared to make war, 
Ld as to Germany's need of French money that was il- 
lusion. It was a widely-spread superstition, which has only 
just disappeared. But Delaisi certainly saw truly, when he 
recognized the danger that threatened Europe m the de- 
termination of England to keep world politics under all 



27 



circumstances on paths which must inevitably lead to a 
break with Germany. That Delaisi did not include the 
Russian factor in his reckonings was due to the situation at 
that time. In the year 1911 it was believed in London that 
Morocco would have to be chosen as the point of attack, 
and that as soon as France had bound itself the participa- 
tion of Russia would follow of itself, by virtue of the Al- 
liance Franco-Russe. 

General Monier's March on Fez in 1911. 

There can be no doubt that Sir Edward Grey had already 
been instructed by France concerning the intended March 
on Fez, when General Monier informed him on the 25th of 
April, 1911, that he would undertake it; and it is equally 
certain that the incompatibility of the French enterprise 
with the stipulations of the documents of Algeciras was 
well known to him. The "North German Public Gazette" 
had, moreover, on the 30th of April pointed out that a 
breach of these stipulations would lead to incalculable com 
sequences. But these very consequences were desired by 
England and France. The press of both countries again 
went to work to excite public sentiment against Germany. 
In France the acceptance of a constitution for Alsace-Lor^ 
raine was turned into grist for this mill. In England, dur^ 
ing the visit of Emperor William, who attended the unveil- 
ing of the monument to Queen Victoria, this campaign was 
temporarily suspended and the Kaiser even honored as a 
guest of whom England was proud. But directly after his 
departure the campaign was taken up again; and even dur- 
ing Emperor William's stay in London Grey explained to 
our ambassador, Metternich, that the agreements made be- 
tween England and France placed on England the obliga- 
tion to support France even in case of the occupation of 
Fez lasting a long time; which admitted of no other inter- 
pretation than that England conceded to France the right to 
annex Morocco by degrees, and was determined to support 
her in this by force of arms. France's proceeding in Mor- 
occo in breach of her agreements met only with approval, 
although the Englishmen who had emigrated to Morocco 
stood diametrically opposed to the French policy of ex- 
ploitation and annexation — certainly a proof that the Eng- 
lish government was not following its own interests in this 
matter. It had only stipulated with France in advance that 
fortifications of the coast might not, in consequence of the 
accession of Morocco, remain in French or Spanish hands. 
It was therefore the more readily offended when, the ap7 
pearance of the "Panther" at Agadir gave proof that Ger- 
many did not mean to permit its treaty rights to be ignored. 

The English fleet destined for Norway was called back to 

28 



Portsmouth, and the whole expeditionary force was also 
set in readiness. Our general staff received reports from its 
agents which described the seriousness of the situation. 
They referred to England's intention to occupy Belgiuni or 
Copenhagen in case of war. Thus our military attache in 
Berne reported on the basis of absolutely reliable reports 
that the landing of English troops in Belgium in the course 
of the summer, had been immediately impending. It was 
also suspicious in the highest degree that at that time the 
journeys of the French General Staff and the manoeuvres 
of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th cavalry divisions took place exclu- 
sively on the Belgian border. Asquith and Lloyd George 
made in their speeches no secret of the fact that they held 
a participation of England in the conflict unavoidable. A 
new situation, said the prime minister, had arisen in Mor- 
occo. England would fulfill its treaty obligations towards 
France, which were, he said, well known to the Chamber; 
and Lloyd George declared in a speech which he held m 
the Mansion House: "If a situation is forced upon us m 
which peace can only be maintained through the surrender 
of the great and beneficent position which England has se- 
cured, then peace at any price would be intolerable humilia- 

fion " 

But what most irritated Sir Edward Grey was that the 
plan conceived by the French Foreign Minister, de Selves: 
to answer the sending of the "Panther" with a French- 
English naval demonstration of Agadir, was, in consequence 
of Caillaux' opposition shipwrecked in the English cabinet, 
which, originally, had not shown itself averse to entermg 
into this dangerous proposition. 

Through the revelations of Faber, the extremely critical 
situation in July, 1911, was later made thoroughly known 
and no one in England was in a position to rebuke him for 
the facts he presented, on the ground that they were lies. 
Not until the German-French treaty of November 4th, was 
the crisis relieved. It had among other things led to Eng- 
land's renewal for another ten years of its offensive and de- 
fensive treaty with Japan on the 13th of July, 1911, that is 
to say practically four years before its expiration, obviously 
it was done with a view to making sure of its ally m the 
East against Germany even in case the war toward which 
the English statesmen were working should break out until 
after August 1, 1915, or should not be settled by that time. 

It was no thanks to Asquith and Grey that the peace was 

lOn Dec 21st, 1911. there was published in the LeiPfig 
Illu''s?ra?ed- olzette a map which showed ^t^ie posUion of the 

i"rfi^\eri^8 'Tho^fwer"e fhe'day" on'^hich ^plSncing' u^on 

iSS «^^sroS^ir^^^frr^^s?d ^ ^ 

marching goals on the continent. 

29 



ultimately maintained in spite of everything. As the stormy 
waves of the Moroccan conflict began to settle, a tendency 
again made itself felt in England which was in sharp oppo- 
sition to the policy of the cabinet. They had experienced 
the uncanny feeling of standing at the edge of an abyss and 
of being dragged against their will into a war in which 
no English interests whatever were at stake. Dn sober 
second thought it became evident that the artfully culti- 
vated bitterness against Germany could not be referred to 
any harm that England had suffered through us, but had 
been kindled by pointing out future possibilities which were 
said to threaten the world position of England. 

Against the consciencelessness of this effort, ever louder 
protests were now raised from the members of the rank and 
fil of the cabinet party. The Orientalist, Edward Granville 
Browne, complained that the English foreign policy had 
never been so secret, so lacking in straightforwardness, and 
so inaccessible to any kind of criticism; that it was more 
autocratic than in Russia. "We risk" — he wrote — "a war 
with Germany, that France may seize unfortunate Morocco; 
we lay ourselves open to the ridicule of our enemies and 
the pity of our friends by our obsequiousness to Russia; we 
estrange the confidence of Islam by our policy in Persia, 
in Turkey and in Morocco, and as to Tripoli we are at least 
open to suspicion." 

Great liberal papers and weeklies such as "Manchester 
Guardian," "Daily Graphic," "Economist" emphatically point- 
ed out that it was a mistake of the English policy to place 
itself in systematic opposition to the vital interests of Ger- 
many, that an entente with Germany would much better 
correspond, from every point of view, with the highest in- 
terests of England. The policy which followed the opposite 
goal was, they declared, "stupid and unbusinesslike." The 
"open letter about the foreign policy 1904-1911" — which such 
balanced and respected publicists as Morel and Hirst signed 
with their initials, was a deadly accusation against the leader 
of the English policies. But it was dismissed by Sir Edward 
Grey with the declaration that England was determined to 
continue its relations in their existing form with France and 
Russia; which, however, meant nothing else than that it 
would proceed with his system of political preparations for 
a war against Germany, and would protect its comrades of 
the Entente even if, in contempt of existing treaties, they 
violated the rights of other powers. A Paris telegram to 
the "Journal de Geneve" published the following striking 
commentary on it: "Sir Edward Grey has declared that there 
exist between France and England no pledges other than 
those which have already been made public. From this the 
conclusion has been drawn that no military conventions 
exist between the two states. That is quite correct; but 

30 



from this it is not to be deduced that England and France 
have never considered the possibility of uniting their mili- 
tary forces." 

The exact facts of the matter are these: Each time that 
a war seemed more or less imminent, the two governments 
entered into a consultation and promised for a limited period 
of time to support each other with their military power. 
That was the case in the summer of 1905, as it was at the 
time of the Casablanca affair. In the course of this year, 
however, the entente cordiale had become so plaint an m- 
strument, that each time that the circimistances seemed to 
demand it, a military arrangement was concluded by word 
of mouth, which was to be binding for the duration of the 
crisis, and which led to the exchange of very definite views 
as to how the armed forces of the two nations were to be 
employed. 

On December 21, the "Daily Chronicle" wrote that if the 
policies of England were guided by public opinion, a Ger- 
man-English iin<nlprstanding would be the work of the near 
future. At no time had the great mass of the English people 
been filled with more 'upright sentiments toward Germany 
than now! Very similar was what appeared in the "Nation" 
of December 30: The time is ripe, it was said, to seek an 
understanding with Germany on the basis of real interests 
in Turkey and in Africa. "Agreements made now would 
put an end to the ruinous rivalry as to fleets, re-establish 
the European concert, and free us from the humiliating de- 
pendence on Russia." 

Lord Haldane's Benevolent Journey. 

Under such auspices began the year 1912. In France on 
the 13th of January, after the fall of Caillaux, it brought 
the "great" Poincare Ministry to the helm, which had as an 
immediate consequence a fresh and violent outbreak of 
chauvinistic propaganda for "Revenge." The thing was so 
striking that as early as April the "Saturday Review" found 
it necessary to direct a serious note of warning at Paris: 
No one in England should overlook, it said, that chauvinism 
was ever on the increase in the French people, that the 
French government was taking care to keep it alive, and 
that a part of the French press thoroughly approved of this 
movement. The intention, it went on to say, of organizing 
a campaign whose purpose was to accustom the English to 
the idea that the moment had come for putting forth a 
great effort in an attempt to win back Alsace and Lorraine, 
was very generally recognized. It was generally assumed 
that it was England's mission to co-operate in this as 
France's second, and they wanted to inoculate, so to speak, 
the public opinion of England with this idea. It would 



however be good if they knew in England that France had 
already embraced a firm decision. 

To the liberal circles of England this attitude of France 
was entirely unpleasing, since the English government, under 
pressure of the tendencies above cited making for an under- 
standing with Germany, had brought itself to the decision* 
to send Lord Haldane to Berlin, ostensibly to initiate an 
understanding, in reality to reconnoitre and to procure fresh 
arguments for the existing fixed policy of the cabinet. The 
"Accuser" can read up on the results of the Haldane Mis- 
sion (February 8-11, 1912) in my study on "How England 
Prevented an Understanding with Germany." It has now 
also been published in English: The New York Times Cur- 
rent History. The European War. Vol. II, July, 1915. Lord 
Haldane recently referred, in a speech delivered July 5, 1915, 
at the Liberal Club in London, to his Berlin negotiations. 
But naturally the failure of the "understanding" is not 
ascribed to the fact that England in the most definite man- 
ner refused to consent to a neutral attitude in case of war, 
but that the gilt is shifted upon the German "War Party," 
whom he was unable to deprive of their fixed idea. 

"I gave myself no headache over Belgium and France. I 
rather recognized that England fights for its existence, and 
never doubted in the least that its participation in the war 
is an imperative necessity ... In the year 1912," he 
said, "we were informed of the alarming condition of affairs; 
the press and the public knew it, too, and to me fell the task 
of establishing the details. After I had informed my col- 
leagues of what I had discovered, we decided to act at once. 
McKenna began by increasing the fleet, and Churchill made 
it twice as strong as the German." 

This acknowledgment of Haldane's is exceedingly im- 
portant because it throws light on the motives which have 
determined England's behavior, and particularly its foreign 
policy up to the outbreak of the war. It was a war policy, 
and an undertaking to promote everything which might, at 
the moment of the conflict which they had in view, be ad- 
vantageous to the three powers conspiring against Germany. 

That a break had not been provoked earlier, happened 
out of consideration for Russia, which was behindhand with 
its preparations for war, and could appeal to the fact that in 
the Reval negotiations a longer period had been set for it. 

Directly after Haldane's return, Churchill delivered the 
notorious speech in which he declared the German fleet to 
be a luxury and the English a necessity. During May oc- 
curred the agitation for the concluding of an Anglo-French 
Alliance (Morning Post, Daily Graphic, Observer, Specta-. 
tor) as a counter-move to the efforts of liberal papers for 
an understanding with Germany. 

32 



In July Englishmen and Frenchmen took part in the Sokol 
celebration at Prague, whose anti-German character revealed 
itself so clearly at the time. In August the "Temps" an- 
nounced the concluding of the Russian-French naval con- 
vention, and added the remark that a startling new political 
arrangement was in question which would not be pointed 
against the Triple Alliance.— "Who still believes in that?''— 
but against Germany and Austria. The naval convention 
was, it was said, in the first place a Russo-Franco-Italian 
Balkan convention; the powers of the Triple Entente were 
already preparing for the Tripolitanian peace. The line of 
attack was perfectly clear; Italy, Russia, France and England 
on the one side, Austria-Hungary on the other, Turkey on 
the dissecting table!!! 

To our ambassador, Count Pourtales, Kokowzew denied,, 
as late as August 7th, the existence of a Russian-French 
naval agreement; but when the news of it came out, he was 
not ready to contradict it. 

In October, Lord Roberts held forth concerning the ine- 
vitability of a war with Germany, and soon after he declared 
that every great nation has a right to fall upon its neighbor 
if it has the power— a piece of cynicism which the "Nation" 
despatched with the remark that it set up a moral code for 
a pack of wolves. It was the same sentiment which was 
championed back in 1903 by Homer Lea when he advised the 
English to deal with the German fleet as they had long since 
dealt with the Danish and the Dutch, i. e., by a sudden sur- 
prise attack to capture or destroy it. 

Grey did not neglect to send quieting assurance to Peters- 
burg and Paris, where the reconnoitering expedition of Hal- 
dane had at first awakened solicitude. He explained that 
the initial impetus toward the negotiations had not come 
from England but from Germany. Correspondingly quieting 
explanations were sent by Russia to England and France 
when the meeting between Kaiser and Czar in Balticport 
(July 4) roused anxiety. In reality as the communique pub- 
lished by Ssassonow and the German Imperial Chancellor 
showed, everything remained as before. Even before this, 
the French had been informed that the 303 million roubles 
which had been demanded by the Douma for the fleet were 
destined to be used against Germany. The head of the Rus- 
sian General Staff and the head of the Admiralty Staff stayed 
in Paris while Kokowzew and Ssassonow were negotiating 
with the Imperial Chancellor; and when, one month later, 
Poincare came to Petersburg, England certainly had cause 
to dismiss all anxiety. The naval convention had been con- 
cluded just before this, and Russia had sent the future com- 
mander-in-chief, Nicolas Nicolajewitch, to France, m order 
to let him take part in the big French manoeuvres on Ger- 

33 



many's west frontier; and Poincare received the promise that 
the Russian military forces should again be concentrated in 
the western provinces on the German and Austrian borders. 

The Indiscretions of "Gil Bias." 

It was not until a year later that the world learned through 
an indiscretion of "Gil Bias" what a price France had to pay 
for these concessions. Mr. Poincare, who had already been 
fixed upon as the future president of the French Republic, 
was given to understand that stern events were to be ex- 
pected and that, sooner or later, the Austrian question 
would lead to serious international complications. They also 
reminded him that at the time when the Russian-French 
Alliance was concluded, the three-year term of military ser^ 
vice existed in France, and that the two-year service since 
introduced, meant a weakening of France. He received, 
moreover, the friendly warning that there was in Petersburg 
a party friendly to Germany which kept forever insisting 
that the French army was no match for the German, and 
that one of the Balkan powers which wanted to join the 
Russian-French Alliance, only hesitated because, compared 
with Germany, France did not seem to it strong enough. 

The threat that lay in these observations was not to be 
misunderstood. In order to maintain the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, Poincare pledged himself to put through the three- 
year compulsory service, and he was forced to consider him- 
self lucky that the Russian government now promised, as 
a further quid pro quo, to devote the new French loan which 
had been assured to it to the building of strategic railways 
in the direction of the frontiers of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary. Parallel with these preparations went the con- 
spiracy in the Balkans led by Russia, from which was await- 
ed the solution of the Oriental question and a new military 
organization, to be turned against Austria. At the end of 
March a treaty was concluded, under the Russian aegis, be- 
tween Servia and Bulgaria, providing for their common de- 
fence and for the protection of their mutual interests in case 
of a disturbance of the status quo on the Balkan Penin- 
sula, or in case a third power should undertake a sudden 
attack on either of the allied powers.^ A secret clause 
pledged both states, before taking any active steps, to apply 
to Russia for its view of the matter. In connection with 
this treaty there were negotiations which dragged Monte- 
negro and Greece also into the conspiracy (into the details 
of which we shall not enter here). But let this one thing 



1 The Bulgarian-Servian Treaty, together with the military 
convention of March 12, 1912, was published in the "Matin" 
of the 25th and 26th of November 1913. 

2 The fact that the Montenegrins had proceeded with their 
declaration of war against Turkey ten days before is to be 
explained by King Nikita's lack of discipline. 

34 



by expressly emphasized: as a result of the whole pro- 
ceeding, the accession of the allied powers to the Triple 
Entente was expected, and France and England were let 
into the secret and that it was agreed that Nicolas II 
should act as supreme arbitrator of any disputes which the 
division of the Turkish territory which was to be conquered, 
might lead to. 

When everything was in readiness, the negotiations at 
Ouchy which had been drawn out on purpose were brought 
to a conclusion. On the 18th of October, Turkey and Italy 
signed the treaty of peace, and so the Balkan war could 
begin, whose progress and vicissitudes we pass over as they 
are well known. Valuable for our purposes are the indis- 
cretions of the Russian press and of the French which per- 
mit us to recognize what were the more far-reaching aims 
connected with this Balkan war-tragedy. In December, 
1912, when a peace conference of the Balkan States was be- 
ing held at Janina, and the quarrel over Saloniki began to 
be a cause of dissension between the Allies, the "Nowoje 
Wremja" set forth the following program disclosing those 
plans of Russia, which later revealed themselves in fact. The 
success of the Balkan states would result in the erecting of 
a new Slavic power on Austria's southern border, which 
would not be subordinated to the Austro-Hungarian diplo- 
macy, a power whose members would, without exception 
owe their existence to Russia, and would therefore instinc- 
tively turn their eyes toward the North, toward the kindred 
Russian Empire. That would mean for the future a close 
alliance in fact with Russia, and a rescue of the Southern 
Slavs from the Germanic peoples threatening them from the 
north; whereas Russia would be acquiring from the Balkan 
States the benefit that Austria, attacked from behind by an 
army of 500,000 Slavs, would be crippled as far as Russia is 
concerned, and the latter would find it possible to solve the 
problem of the Straits in its own way. It was therefore a 
fateful question, on which the future depended whether Rus- 
sia would take advantage of the favorable situation. In 
Russia people were confident that the reorganization of the 
Russian army had made much more rapid and much greater 
advances than could have been predicted in the days of the 
Reval meeting. 

That it was from now on only a question of finding an 
occasion for war, was also shown by the attitude of the 
"Temps" which was at that time inspired from Petersburg 
through its correspondence, and also directly from the Rus- 
sian Embassy in Paris. On December 15, 1912, parallel with 
the above-mentioned arguments of the "Nowoje Wremja," 
this most poisonous and dangerous of anti-German boule- 
vard sheets brought the news that the mobilization of Aus- 

35 



tria had forced Russia to take precautionary measures. It 
mentioned, in particular, that the transportation of freight 
on the railway lines of the southwest had been very mate- 
rially cut down because of the unbroken demand for war 
material. Warsaw, it said, presented, because of the as- 
sembly of troops there in great numbers, an entirely unusual 
appearance. In all armories there was drilling, in order to 
train in the great mass of assembled recruits. No discharges 
were granted. In official circles preparations were proceed- 
ing, unannounced, but not denied, while in the circles of the 
military a war with Austria was discussed as a thing in- 
evitable. Russia itself (this article went on to say) would 
have to seize the favorable moment and strike the first blow 
that very winter. All Russia had familiarized itself with the 
prospect of the Austrian war. 

The further developments were in the following direc- 
tion: toward the end of the year (on December 4, 1912) a 
truce was concluded between the three allied Balkan states 
and Turkey, and in London a peace conference was held 
whose outcome showed that these allies were in their heart 
of hearts enemies. They were able once more to issue a 
common ultimatum to Turkey and again take up the war, 
but then came the turning point: the coup d'etat of Enver 
Pasha, the quarrel about Adrianople and Scutari, the recon- 
quest of Adrianople by the Turks, and then the quarrel be- 
tween the allies for the booty, which led to the defeat of 
Bulgaria, to the peace of Bucharest, and finally to the con- 
clusion of peace between Bulgaria and Turkey (October 12, 
1913). All this created an entirely new political situation, 
whose various phases became of decisive influence upon the 
great conspiracy directed against Germany and Austria- 
Hungary. 

In France Poincare had in the meanwhile been elected 
president of the Republic. On the 18th of February he cele- 
brated his entrance into the Elysee. The Czar honored him 
with a congratulatory telegram, a distinction that had not 
been allotted to any of his predecessors, but the Paris bourse 
answered the vainglorious message of the president with a 
slump in the market, for it recognized quite rightly that 
France had received a war president. Delcasse was ap- 
pointed Ambassador at Petersburg. His instructions were, 
to turn the Franco-Russian defensive alliance into a defen- 
sive and offensive alliance. Therewith began the enormous 
agitation for the introduction of the three year compulsory 
service, and at the same time, the endeavor to inoculate the 
public opinion of France with the idea that the conflict be- 
tween Servia and Austria which was at the time becoming 
ever more critical was not to be taken tragically, since a 
danger to peace would exist only in case the powers of the 

36 



Triple Entente regarded the Austrian threats, which "could 
not be followed by any act" as anything more than a bluff. 



Slav Banquets and Mobilization. 

In Russia they thought otherwise. In January the Peters- 
burg cabinet had already declared to Turkey that in case of 
a recurrence of the war Russia could not guarantee its neu- 
trality. The Minister of War Ssuchomlinow had expressed 
himself to an editor of the "Temps" to the effect that the 
military situation of Russia was excellent, — obviously in 
order to put an end to the doubts as to the readiness of the 
Czar's empire for war, which were at that time beginning to 
find utterance in Paris. In Petersburg Slav dinners and 
Slav banquets were held, which, in view of a possible con- 
flict between Austria-Hungary and Servia championed, in 
more and more ardent tones, the watchword — "Away with 
all concessions, and forward to war!" At the end of Janu- 
ary five Russian army corps were mobilized and stationed 
under the command of General Rennenkampf with its head- 
quarters at Wilna. Parallel with this went a poisonous 
instigation of attacks directed against the German colonists 
in the western and southwestern provinces, while the Rus- 
sian diplomacy at the same time bent all efforts to drag 
Roumania, which by binding treaties belonged to the Triple 
Alliance, over into the Russian camp. 

Particularly noteworthy was the third of the Slavic ban- 
quets on February 19, 1913. It had concluded the resolu- 
tion which it sent to the Czar by telegraph with the words: 
'We understand that it is not compatible with the dignity 
and the interests of Russia to yield to Austria-Hungary or 
to protect Turkey against complete destruction," and there- 
upon received the thanks of the Czar for the sentiments 
"expressed by the participants at the Slavic Banquet in re- 
gard to their Slavic brothers." This imperial answer caused 
a tremendous sensation. It was interpreted as a repudia- 
tion of the endeavors toward an understanding on the 
Balkan questions which had at that time been set on foot 
by Austria through Count Hohenlohe, and led to immoder- 
ate attacks by the press on Austria, which was declared to 
stand on the verge of economic, financial and military col- 
lapse, whereas the Russian diplomacy "has at its service a 
powerful empire of inexhaustible vital energy, a great army 
which is eagerly longing to restore its glory and the unre- 
served support of two great powers, and, added to all this, 
the heroic league of the Balkan peoples." So sure did they 
feel themselves of the cooperation of the great anti-Austrian 
coalition, which was naturally also regarded as an anti- 
German one. 

37 



About this time, at the beginnig of March, the Czar con- 
vened a council of ministers in the Winter Palace in order 
to decide the question of peace or war. The result of this 
conference was communicated by himself to the gentlemen 
of his immediate entourage. "We shall" — he said — "have 
no war. Ssuchomlinow Ssassonow and Kokowzew say that 
we need 5-6 years more in order to be prepared."^ The 
result of this recognition was that there took place an un- 
derstanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia concern- 
ing a lessening in the number of their border troops, and by 
the middle of May the danger of war could be looked upon 
as eliminated. All the more lively became the agitation in 
the press and at the Slavic celebrations in Petersburg, as 
well as the echo which these voices found in Moscow. A 
great Moscow paper argued that the existence of Austria- 
Hungary was useful to nobody, but was on the contrary 
harmful to the whole world. A "decent winding up of the 
affairs of this new political corpse" they declared to be 
irremissible. A Petersburg letter to the "Journal des 
Debats" simultaneously declared that even the peacefully 
minded regretted that the crisis had not been settled by a 
war. 

How seriously this mood of the public mind of Russia, at 
the and of the persons standing at the back of it and urging 
it on toward war, was regarded among us, was shown by the 
unanimous passing of our military budget on the 30th of 
June. It could not be supposed that that very spacious 
term of five to six years for Russia to prepare completely 
for war, would be strictly adhered to. The time had obvi- 
ously been set so far off, only in order to quiet the Czar, 
who did not like decisions close at hand. As a new factor 
there was added the fear that the discontent over the re- 
actionary and despotic policy of the Russian government 
might lead to a second revolution. Its probably very immi- 
nent outbreak was reported to me in October, 1913, with 
great positiveness by a person close to those with whom 
the final decision rested. The consequence of this appre- 
hension was that, under pressure of the Slavophile influ- 
ences and in view of the anxiety caused by the internal con- 
ditions of the empire, the Russian diplomacy showed itself 
extraordinarily nervous, and, in the affair of the military 



1 Probably Kokowzew had succeeded in moving his two 
colleagues to this declaration, which was in direct opposition to 
their previous position. He, the premier, was at that time 
being- given much anxiety by the relations within the country. 
It was only after the lapse of a year, when the old Goremykin 
took Kokowzew's place, that the view prevailed that inner 
difficulties could be best overcome by a victorious foreign war. 
There was then no longer any talk about longer periods of 
time for the training of the army. And at the outbreak of 
the war it became evident that they considered themselves in 
every respect "archipret." 

38 



mission of General Liman von Sanders, "jostled" Germany 
— as one may well put it — so rudely that, except for the 
unusually conciliatory attitude of our diplomacy, it might 
have come to a break as early as that. 

This whole movement of the Russian diplomacy was par- 
ticularly striking in view of that decision at the March con- 
ference, and was the more noteworthy as it took place with- 
out any previous understanding with England and France. 
For the English, moreover, this procedure on the part of 
the Russians was particularly disagreeable as the Turkish 
fleet had been standing since June, 1912, under the command 
of the English Admiral Limpus, and as English firms (Arm- 
strong-Vickers) had been busy with the reorganization of 
the Turkish wharves and marine arsenals at the Golden 
Horn. It is, then, very remarkable that at this very time 
Russia should have shown itself much less sensitive toward 
Austria. When in September and October Servia's game 
in Albania led to a new and dangerous Austro-Servian 
crisis, Servia, in view of the attitude of the official leaders 
of the Russian policies, had to submit to an Austrian ulti- 
matum. 

The explanation of this circumstance is to be found in 
the attitude assumed by France and England at that time. 
The new president of the French Republic made a tour of 
France for the purpose of creating sentiment for the carry- 
ing through of the three year compulsory service, while the 
French press, in harmony with the Unionistic sheets of 
England, agitated for universal compulsory service in Eng- 
land. Mr. Poincare's trip to London bore the character of 
an inaugural visit, and took place in the hope of a return 
visit of King George to Paris. Finally the agreements con- 
cerning a great new Russian loan of 2>^ thousand millions 
of francs in France were completed, whereas a loan which 
was negotiated in Paris by Austria-Hungary was wrecked 
under Russian pressure, and every giving of financial sup- 
port to Turkey was similarly prevented. It was an exceed- 
ingly noteworthy political game. They hoped in Paris on 
the one hand to separate Austria from Germany in spite of 
everything, and on the other hand, to prevent Turkey from 
joining the Triple Entente. 

Anglo-French Naval Co-operation. 

Even more involved was England's double game. The 
negotiations, which had for a long time hung fire with Ger- 
many, concerning the adjustment of their mutual interests 
in the Bagdad Railway district, and in Africa at Portugal's 
expense, were again taken up, and, with apparent sincerity, 
led very close to a conclusion, so that in September, 1913, an 
agreement seemed to be immediately at hand. That in this, 

39 



as in the negotiations for a naval convention, which were 
similarly renewed, there was only the deceptive appearance 
of reality, we know from those admissions of Haldane on 
July 5, 1915, which we have cited above. They were moves 
in the game of preparing for that "struggle for existence" 
which Haldane had, on his return from Berlin in February 
1912, represented to his colleagues in the cabinet as in- 
evitable. 

Yet the visit of King George V, to Paris, where he arrived 
on April 21, 1915, accompanied by Sir Edward Grey, — who, 
on this occasion set foot for the first time in his life on the 
soil of the Continent — became of decisive significance. As 
to the course of this visit and its meaning, we are thoroughly 
informed, through the "Documents concerning the Outbreak 
of the War"\ Section 7 of the new German White Book, 
between England and France for cooperation at sea in case 
of war, that the English fleet would take over the protection 
of the North Sea, of the Channel, and of the Atlantic Ocean, 
in order to allow the French the possibility of concentrating 
their fleet in the western Mediterranean, where Malta would 
be put at their service as a point of support. The English 
Mediterranean fleet was then to come under the command 
of a French Admiral, the FrencL torpedo boats and sub- 
marines were to be put to use in the Channel. 

The same source informs us that in May, as a result of 
the visit of George V, it was proposed by France — along 
with a series of political questions which were taken up — 
that the existing military and political agreements between 
France and England be supplemented by corresponding 
agreements between England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey 
took up the proposal very sympathetically, but declared him- 
self unable, without the consent of the cabinet, to give any 
binding answer. 

It follows from later Paris reports dated July, — although 
the exact day is not mentioned — that the proposal of a Rus- 
sian-English naval convention is to be traced back to Iswol- 
ski, who wanted to make the royal visit to Paris serve as a 
means of turning the Triple Entente into an alliance after 
the pattern of the Triple Alliance. Out of consideration for 
the English disinclination toward forming alliances, how- 
ever, they gave up, for the immediate future, the carrying 
out of this larger plan and preferred to proceed step by step. 
And the report had now come in, that the English cabinet 
had, upon Grey's recommendation, agreed to the conclusion 
of a naval convention, and decided that the negotiations 
should take place in London between the English Admiralty 
and the Russian naval attache Mr. Wolkow. The above 



1 First published in the "North German Public Gazette" of 
October 16, 1914. 

40 



authority cited in the White Book goes on to add that the 
satisfaction of the Russian and the French diplomacy over 
this new taking of the English politicians by surprise was 
great, and the conclusion of a formal alliance was held to 
be only a matter of time. Wolkow then went to Petersburg 
with the text of the Franco-English naval conventions, and 
soon was back in London with instructions for his negotia- 
tions. 

What these instructions were is shown by a report pro- 
ceeding very evidently from Petersburg which is based on 
the minutes, or possibly on an extract from the minutes, 
of a conference which was held on the 26th of May at the 
headquarters of the Chief of the Russian Admiralty StafI 
for the purpose of fixing on the basis of the negotiations 
with England. It is important enough to be given here 
in full: 

"In consideration of the fact that an agreement between 
Russia and England concerning the cooperation of their 
naval forces in the case of war-like operations of Russia and 
England, participated in by France, is desired, the confer- 
ence arrived at the following conclusions: 

"The projected naval convention is to regulate the rela- 
tions between the Russian and English armed forces at Sea 
in all particulars, which entails an understanding concern- 
ing signals and special codes, radio telegrams and the man- 
ner of communication between the Russian and English 
Naval Staffs. The two naval staffs shall, moreover, make 
reports to each other at regular intervals concerning the 
fleets of third powers, and concerning their own fleets, par- 
ticularly as to technical data, as well as newly introduced 
machines and inventions. There shall also take place ex- 
change of views at regular intervals between the Russian 
and the English Naval Staff, after the pattern provided by 
the Franco-Russian agreement, for the examination of ques- 
tions which interest the two naval ministries. The Russian 
naval convention with England shall, like the Franco- 
Russian, make provision for previously agreed upon, but 
separate, actions of the Russian and English navies. As to 
strategic aims, a distinction is to be made between the naval 
operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea districts, on 
the one hand, and the prospective sea fights in the Medi- 
terranean on the other. In both districts Russia must en- 
deavor to receive compensation for relieving a part of the 
English fleet so that it can deal with the German fleet. 

"In the Bosphorus and Dardanelles region, temporary 

^ I want to point out in this connection that to this end a 
system of espionage has been organized in Pomerania for years, 
and that a part of its membership has acquired property in 
Pomerania. 

41 



undertakings in the Straits, as strategic operations of Russia 
in case of war, shall be taken into consideration. 

"The Russian interests in the Baltic demand that England 
retain as large a part of the German fleet as possible in the 
North Sea. The overwhelming numerical superiority of the 
German fleet over the Russian would thereby be done away 
with, and a Russian landing in Pomerania perhaps become 
possible.^ In this connection the English government could 
perform a substantial service, if, before the beginning of 
warlike operations, it were to send a great number of merch- 
ant ships to the Baltic ports, that the shortage of Russian 
transport ships be made up. 

"As far as the situation in the Mediterranean is concerned, 
it is of the highest importance for Russia that a certain pre- 
ponderance of the Entente fleet over the Austro-Italian 
be secured. For, in case the Austro-Italian forces 
govern this sea, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the 
Black Sea would be possible, which would be a dangerous 
blow to Russia. It must be assumed that the Austro-Italian 
forces preponderate over the French. England would there- 
fore have to secure the majority of forces to the Entente 
powers, by despatching the necessary number of ships to the 
Mediterranean, at least so long as the development of the 
Russian navy has not proceeded far enough to assume the 
solution of this problem itself. Russian ships would have 
to be able to use with England's consent, English ports as 
a base in the eastern Mediterranean, just as the French 
naval convention permits the Russian fleet to use the French 
ports as a base in the western Mediterranean." 

Through an indiscretion which appeared in the press, it 
became known that the negotiations of Wolkow with Prince 
Louis of Battenberg took place on the basis of these instruc- 
tions. At that time he was First Lord of the Admiralty, 
today, as is well known, he is placed on the shelf as a 
"German." 

Sir Edward Grey and the Naval Convention. 

That England delayed the concluding of the naval con- 
vention longer than the Russians liked, so that eventually 
it could not be signed before the outbreak of the war, was 
due to the fact that at that very time the English press had 
become distrustful, and pointed particularly to the existing 
policies of Russia which stood in opposition to English in- 
terests in Persia and in India. Grey who was forced to 
deny, in Parliament, his relations to Russia, and simultane- 
ously had to negotiate with Russia, fell into a very em- 
barrassed situation. But he saved himself by bare-faced 
lying. On the 11th of June, he gave, when interpellated by 
Mr. King concerning the English-Russian naval convention, 

42 



the following information, according to the stenographic 

''"Tr\tn7rabirmember for North Somerset put a simi- 
lar question last year in regard to land forces and the hon- 
orable member fo'; North Salford also put °n *f ,-"^ ^^/, 
; timilar Question to the one he has agam put today, ine 
pr me minister answered at that time that, if a war be ween 
?he European powers breaks out, there exist no ""P"bl'=hed 
a/reements which could limit or disturb the freedom of the 
government or of Parliament to_ decide on the q-^f- » 
whether England shall take part m a war. Th s answer cov 
whthf Questions which lie before me m wntmg. It 

which would make th.s assertion les t™". ^° i"^ judge, 
of that sort are in progress and it is, as far as 1 can ju s , 

mmmmm 

eluded, for the naval negot.ations ^ ^^^-^^^^^offieially 
wavering ^X^f^^'.^ey werf pending, since the whole 
aware of the tact tnat i"=J Lord of the Admir- 

matter had been g.ven over to the t.rst ^om ^^^ 

alty, at the suggestion, to be sure, of S«r Edwara y ^^^^_ 

finally the agreements with F-.^"": ^2 bore pour sauver la 
ulated in the letters of Noyember 1912. bore, P ^^ 

face, a qualified .character! That England as _^ ^^^^ ^^_ 
fact, was bound hand and fo^ was depe ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ 
cisions as Russia or Fran« mi=nt ^^.^jjed, by Par- 

not been discovered nor f °7'' i.* ^J'L _„ith and the narrow 
liament; it was known on y to G'ey- f'*' p„liament also did 
circle of their confidants in the cabinet^ Jen decided on, on 
not know that war with Germany had been tun- 

principle, since 1909, and that --^^^'hen onlyj ^^^ PP^^^^^^^ 
ity was being looked for to conduct it ^^_ 

possible certainty of success. . I" l'„°^',X goal, and it did 
lieved themselves in England to be n«a;^^%Lferences and 
not lie with England that congresses ana ^^^^^ 

not the sword, decided the co^f^f °* *^f,'ection of postpon- 
however, English policy took the "ew direct o p ^ 



43 



until then every conflict must be avoided, and Germany be 
kept to the idea by means of negotiations concerning the 
pending problems: of the proportion of naval construction 
year; of naval celebration; African colonies; Bagdad Rail- 
way (that it had little to fear from England). As is well 
known, we held fast to this idea until the last moment. 
The game of Sir Edward Grey was luckily played. Now his 
cards lie before us, and we see that they are the cards of a 
professional card sharper. 

Nor do they today in England avoid admitting this, or 
indeed, boasting about it. In the "Cologne Gazette" of July 
Uth of this year is published the letter of an Englishman 
to a Chilean which was given out in the "Gazeta Militar" a 
paper, appearing in Santiago de Chile. This letter, because 
of the "brutal frankness" with which it champions that 
"Morality for a pack of wolves" to which we above referred, 
deserves to be hung lower, as an important document of con- 
temporary history. 

"Germany" — so says the Englishman's letter — "had become 
a deadly poison for British trade. 'Made in Germany' was 
already an intolerable nightmare. Wherever an Englishman 
wanted to conclude a deal a German competitor came out 
victorious, and every manufactured article produced in Eng- 
land would run up against an equally good, or better article 
manufactured more cheaply in Germany. And not alone 
England suffered from the consequences of German cheap- 
ness; it had become a universal plague. France, Belgium 
and Russia had also to watch how their factories rapidly 
retrograded; they were flooded by German wares under such 
alarming circumstances that it cried to heaven. And it is a 
fact that it was in these countries, in Belgium particularly, 
rather than in England, that there arose the idea of an alli- 
ance to settle Germany's hash. Before the attack on Liege 
the Germans did not know how well Belgium was prepared, 
and today they still believe in its innocence." 

"From the above you can gauge what more the future has 
in store for the poor German. I can assure you that no 
part of the program of this war was for England something 
unforeseen, and that, however, the fortunes of war may turn 
out, the result of the war will bring us profit and the busi- 
ness will bloom here as never before. All the Belgian fac- 
tories have already disappeared; the industrial districts of 
France and Russia are laid waste by armies, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary will remain ruined, consequently, only the 
English factories will remain to supply the world, and if we 
can succeed in persuading Spain and Italy to take part in 
the struggle, these prospects would be even more complete. 
There are no grounds for getting excited over the ruin and 
the desolation that the war calls forth on the continent, for 

44 



the greater they are, the greater and the more positive will 
be the advantages for England." 

To which the "Gazeta Militar" adds the remark: "The 
recipient of the above letter hands it over to the public as a 
sign of protest against the inhuman views it contains, and 
will send to its author, as his sole answer, the number of the 
'Gazeta' in which it appears." 

Here at last is a voice which openly acknowledges the 
motives of the men who made the war; after all the official 
hypocrisy, one sincere word. 

We recommend it to the "Accuser," to purge him of the 
esteem in which he holds the disinterested love of peace of 
his English heroes. He has now received a picture of the 
actual preliminary history of the war, a piece of truth, inso- 
far as it can today be confirmed, and insofar as it can be 
brought to light without damage to our interests. We shall 
not enter upon a polemic against his exposition of the offi- 
cial publications of the material that refers to the time be- 
tween the murder of the archduke and the outbreak of the 
war. He was, to say the least, exceedingly uncritical and 
unscientific in his treatment of those diplomatic despatches 
which were published by the powers of the Entente after a 
previous understanding, and with the omission of all that 
showed how the conspiracy hung together; indeed, in all 
probability he glorified them against his better judgment, 
deliberately and craftily turning the German publications to 
his own account, in order to make his theses believable. 
Under the title "The Diplomatic Struggles Before the War," 
and with the use of citations that drive his points home, 
these questions have been examined by Ludwig Bergstrasser 
with scientific thoroughness, exhaustively and impartially. 
Of the arguments and assertions of the "Accuser" it leaves 
not a single point unrefuted. In the most recent number 
of the Historical Magazine of Meinecke and Vigener Pp. 
48-592 Bergstrasser's excellent study is published. Be it 
highly recommended to our readers. We add to this a ref- 
erence to the excellent book of Dr. Ernst Miiller-Meiningen: 
"The World War and the Collapse of International Law," 
(3rd edition. Berlin 1915. Published by George Reimer.) 
And finally, there have recently been added the despatches 
of the Belgian ambassadors from London, Paris, Berlin 
published by the "North German Gazette," where proceeds, 
from impartial lips, a loud protest against the intrigues 
which were woven by England, France and Russia, against 
the peace of the world. No other conclusion can be drawn 
from these documents. But the blood which has been shed 
in this war, and all the misery which has accompanied it, 
cries out to Heaven for vengeance. It will fall upon those 
who instigated the war! 

45 



But to the "Accuser," one word in conclusion. He calls 
his book a book of truth. In reality it is a book of miser- 
able slanders, written out of the restless vanity of a life 
estranged from the soil of his native country; an act of 
revenge for a past for which he himself is to blame, an act 
which is forced to hide itself under the veil of anonymity. 
A man from whom every German turns away with loathing, 
and of whom, it will be said, when finally his name is given 
over to universal contempt: "God keep our children and 
our children's children from becoming like this man, who 
in the hour of the supreme struggle of our people for its 
existence, let himself be used as the herald of the enemies 
of Germany." 




46 



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